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Animals and African Ethics is a monograph written by Kai
Horsthemke that addresses the treatment of animals in the African context. More precisely, in this book, Horsthemke carries
out a moral anthropological and normative project. The moral
anthropological project is to provide an overview of African
ethical perspectives on the treatment and moral status of animals. The normative project consists of analyzing moral dilemmas regarding animals in an African context and building the
groundwork for a non-speciesist Africa. That is, Horsthemke’s
normative objective in Animals and African Ethics is to offer
an African theory of animal rights. The main thesis of the book
is that African moral and legal thought is largely anthropocentric.
The book is divided into 10 chapters. In chapter 1, by following the typology offered by Henry Odera Oruka using African
philosophy, Horsthemke discusses the various kinds of African
philosophy available. By analying this typology, Horsthemke
then contends that African philosophy can be divided into the
precolonial and the postcolonial. According to him, a key feature that distinguishes these two is that the former is, in general
terms, characterized by being an oral tradition and the latter a
written tradition. Also in chapter 1, Horsthemke contends that
there are some themes central to discussions in African philosophy; namely, the relevance of African indigenous knowledge
systems, the concept of ubuntu, the importance of consensus,
African communalism, the relevance of the legacy of colonialism, and the capacity and relevance for African philosophy to
be ethically responsive. Furthermore, Horsthemke tries to link
these topics with the theme of animal rights and discusses the
possible contribution that the specificities of African philosophy can give to world philosophy.
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In chapter 2, Horsthemke discusses how religion and culture
have influenced African ethical thought. Chapter 3 addresses
the African idea of a hierarchy of beings. He says that despite
the differences among African religions, there are some common features in this form of ethical thought. In particular, an
idea that is rather present in African religious thought is that
the hierarchy of beings starts with God, before descending to
human beings and finally the rest of animate and inanimate creation. Although this ethical thought places humans in a higher
place than animals, Horsthemke contends that humans are understood to have, as a result of their status, a moral responsibility for animals, even though this responsibility is mainly
indirect, resulting as it does from the responsibility towards
God. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss moral questions that relate to
multicultural contexts in the treatment of animals. These address topics where there is a tension between cultural rights
and animal rights. Chapters 6 and 7 are dedicated to exploring two key concepts of African philosophy and its application
to animals, namely ubuntu and ukama. Horsthemke concludes
that, in broad terms, these concepts are anthropocentric and do
not offer sufficient protection to animals.
Chapter 8 is a discussion of animal law in East, West and
Southern Africa. Here, Horsthemke outlines and critically analyzes the legal provisions made for the welfare and protection
of nonhuman animals. Horsthemke concludes that this law is
anthropocentric. Chapter 9 is an examination of the idea of environmental justice in Africa. As in previous chapters, Horsthemke concludes that this is driven by an anthropocentric line
of thought, which is manifested in environmental policies.
Chapter 10 offers a sketch of a normative approach to the
status of animals from an African point of view. Even though
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Horsthemke considers that African morality is, in broad terms,
anthropocentric, he thinks that it is possible to build an African-inspired moral theory. However, this chapter is rather
short and does not develop a full account of how this could be
achieved.
This is a timely book. In the political arena, non-Westerners
are often characterized as more cruel to animals than Westerners and the intellectual productions of Africans are routinely
classified as inferior. This book, even though Horsthemke believes that African ethical thought is largely anthropocentric,
disproves both these ideas by providing evidence that Africans
do care about animals, even if accidentally, and that there is the
possibility for an African theory of animal rights that deserves
merit and consideration.
This is also timely because African philosophy is an emerging area of thought. After the post-war era in Africa, various
academics worldwide have engaged in African philosophy and
to apply its concepts to various moral dilemmas. Some of these
philosophers include Bruce Janz, Thaddeus Metz and Pedro
Tabensky. Before that, African philosophy was largely an oral
tradition. Hence, this book comes at a time where this kind of
philosophy is flourishing.
A way that this monograph could be strengthened is by emphasizing precisely the neglect that African philosophy has
received from Western mainstream academia and how this
current neglect has become a form of neo-colonialism in Africa. If this were included, it would help us understand how the
scapegoating of Africans as being cruel to animals reinforces
speciesism in the West. That is, by pointing out the reasons for
the neglect by mainstream Western academics of African phi-
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losophy, in particular the African philosophy of animal rights,
Horsthemke could demonstrate that this neglect reinforces the
incorrect idea that Western standards of the treatment of animals are better than other standards, thereby reinforcing Western practices towards animals.
Another way that the monograph’s contribution could be
strengthened would be by offering a more detailed normative
theory, which is here only lightly suggested in chapter 10 and
the Appendix. This could consist of a more charitable understanding of the concepts of ubuntu and ukama and a systematic
comparison with competing theories, such as Peter Singer’s
utilitarianism and Gary Francione’s abolitionism.
To conclude, Animals and African Ethics is an excellent
book that offers a moral anthropological analysis of African
values and a normative account of various normative problems
regarding animals in an African context. I would add, however,
that while African theories of animals are worth consideration
and merit when compared with competing approaches to the
rights of animals, this was not emphasized in the book.
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